Every now and then I run into Christians who have concluded that the American Revolution was a biblically unjustified war. These men (they’re always men) are bright and serious minded about the faith. Given the nationalistic flavor of much conservative Christianity in the U.S., I appreciate their willingness to challenge often unexamined assumptions of the (ostensible) congruence of our commitment to Christ and to our nation. That’s not necessarily an easy thing to do in a nation in which almost every church puts an American flag next to the altar. (The presence of the flag need not be a bad thing, to be sure. But the implication of its presence is, well, studiously ambiguous, and what modifies what is critical: Are we Christian Americans, or American Christians. The first is just fine. The second is a form of syncretism. It’s unclear to me that a flag next to the altar represents only the former and not the latter.)
Yet while I appreciate the sincerely held views of these individuals, I’ve typically found their historical understanding of the events leading up to the Revolution to be a bit thin in this way: In my experience, they tend basically to view the Revolution as a mob action against duly constituted authority. And so a fairly direct appeal to Romans 13 ends the matter in favor of the British and against the colonists.
But I do not think that things are at all that clear cut against the colonists. There are several points in particular that this “revisionist” view tends to ignore. First, it tends to ignore that the colonists were represented in their own local legislatures. Secondly, the view tends to ignore that there was real ambiguity in the British constitution about the relationship of the colonial “parliaments” to the British Parliament in London. Finally, the view ignores that the constitutional crisis over taxation was a crisis precisely over the constitutional question of the accepted British constitutional right to be governed only by those laws to which one has consented through the legislature.
It is well known that the colonies had their own legislatures. Less well known is that the role of these legislatures in the British Empire had not been constitutionally well defined in the first half of the seventeenth century.
The Glorious Revolution of 1688, as it were, ratified the constitutional principle that the British king ruled in (i.e., with) Parliament. This was the bedrock principle of British constitutionalism after 1688.
The problem arose because the colonists sort of thought that they took the constitutional right of representation with them while the metropolitan authorities sort of thought that the colonists didn’t take this right with them. The problem is that the issue really didn’t force itself on either “side” for most of the first half of the seventeenth century, and so the ambiguity remained. (If an ambiguity can fester, then perhaps we can call it a festering ambiguity.)
In any event, the colonists were not represented in the British Parliament in London, but were represented in their colonial legislatures. This becomes important.
The next step sounds really weird to the modern ear, but understanding it is critical to understand why the imposition of a mild tax met with such resistance from the colonists: Under the British constitution, “taxation” was understood as a voluntary gift from the people to the crown. The British took the notion of representation seriously. “Consent” from your representative was your consent. That a tax required parliamentary consent to be imposed, meant that the people voluntarily gave the revenue to the crown. This, too, was the bedrock principle of British constitutionalism.
From the beginning, the colonists framed their argument in terms of their rights under the British constitution.
For example, the colonial “Stamp Act Congress” resolved, among other things:
“That all supplies to the crown, being free gifts of the people, it is unreasonable, and inconsistent with the principles and spirit of the British Constitution, for the people of Great Britain to grant to his Majesty the property of the colonies.”
Similarly, in perhaps the most widely read tract of the era, John Dickinson, drawing on British legal precedent, argued that “gifts and grants of their own property . . . made by the people [to the king]” go under several names, as taxes and subsidies. “But whatever the name was, they were always considered as gifts of the people to the crown, to be employed for public uses.”
These references could be multiplied.
When the British Parliament imposed a tax on the colonists without the approval of the colonial assemblies, even though the tax was modest, the unexplicated ambiguity in the constitution regarding the relationship of Parliament to the colonial assemblies became immediately highlighted.
The irony, of course, is that both sides of the dispute thought they were fighting for the same principle. For the metropolitan authorities, 1688 vindicated the right of the Parliament – the one in London – to government the entire British Empire. For the colonists, 1688 vindicated the right of Englishmen to be governed by laws of their own consent wherever they traveled. The constitutional crisis concerned the
portability of British rights.
The thing is, there was no principled resolution to this constitutional ambiguity, aside from insisting on one answer or the other.
The point for us, however, is that, as I understand the literature, historians seem to agree that the colonists had a colorable constitutional claim. There is no Romans 13 argument for why the colonists had to concede the previously unresolved question in favor of the metropolitan authorities, who, like the colonists, insisted on their previously unexercised “right” over the colonies as much out of interest as out of principle.
So the colonists had a colorable constitutional argument, and had constituted authorities – the colonial assemblies – who arguably had a right to intervene on their behalf against what was, arguably, a usurping political authority on the part of the metropolitan government.
This is not to say that the British Parliament did not also have a colorable argument. This is the tragedy of the Revolution – it pivoted around a constitutional ambiguity that, once revealed, could not be abstractly resolved because it implicated the direct interests of both sides in the dispute.
In any event, I see no biblical argument that would force the colonists to concede the constitutional argument in favor of the British that does not equally require the British to concede the point, and so, in my judgment, the colonists did not violate Romans 13 in insisting on their rights, provoking the British authorities to military action, and then responding in kind to the British military action.