In the last post I outlined what I thought were some tensions in the Confessions dealing with God and government. To summarize: The Augsburg itself seems to identify the authority of the civil government as a power only to protect the body from manifest injury (or perhaps it is injury from others). This suggests not only that the state should not enforce the first table of the law, but also that there are elements of the second table that the state should not enforce (depending on how “manifest” the harm, or perhaps whether it is self-injury).
On the other hand, confessional teaching on the first use of the law suggests that the civil government can enforce aspects of both tables of the law, and other parts of the Confessions seem to instruct civil magistrates to look out for the church, remove errors in the church, “heal consciences,” “propagate . . . the Gospel of Christ,” and etc.
Do these diverse affirmations cohere? I don’t know for sure. But here are some suggestions. (Additional suggestions are welcomed.)
Suggestion #1. The Augsburg’s affirmation in article xxviii should be taken as a fundamental lens through which to understand other confessional statements on the authority of government. The other statements are mainly directed to specific individuals at specific times. If those stand for anything, they stand for the proposition that there while the Augsburg’s affirmation states the general rule, there are exceptions to that rule in times of great emergency. For example, when a heterodox church enlists a government to try to suppress the orthodox church, it is entirely proper for the orthodox church to ask for protection from another government.
Problem with suggestion #1: This does not seem to me to do adequate justice to the confessional teaching on the first use of the law.
Suggestion #2. The Augsburg’s affirmation in article xxviii should
not be taken as the fundamental lens to understand other confessional statements on the authority of government. Article xxviii, after all, is dedicated to discussing the power of
bishops, not the power of the civil government. Its discussion of civil power is only by way of stating that bishops are abusing their authority to preach the Gospel and administer the sacraments when the extend their authority into civil matters.
This article’s discussion of “bodies” and “manifest injury” is a discussion of power that bishops should not exercise because they do not have any proper authority over these matters. The teaching on civil power are controlled by this purpose, so we should not attempt to draw a whole doctrine of civil authority from this article, since instruction on that point is not the article’s purpose. (In this case what Augsburg is doing is taking the clearest case of civil power -- protecting bodies from injury by others -- and pointing out how absurd it is for preachers of the gospel to be concerned with temporal matters like that, when the eternal souls of their people depend on their spiritual care. In doing so the Augsburg would not be attempting to provide a comprehensive definition of civil power in this article.)
Instead, the Confession’s several statements on the “first use of the law” should be taken as the fundamental starting point for discussions of civil authority.
Problem with Suggestion #2. While the main purpose of article xxviii may be to instruct us on ecclesiastical power, in so doing, the Augsburg provides an affirmative definition of civil authority. That the definition is incidental to defining ecclesiastical power does not make it any less authoritative. Further, confessional teaching on “the first use of the law,” while controlling as well, are typically brief statements and do not seem intended to set out a full-fledged teaching on civil authority.
Suggestion #3. When the Confessions talk about civil rulers having “regard for the interests of the church,” they are speaking to appropriate civil interests only, not authorizing civil authority to intrude on spiritual matters for spiritual purposes.
The distinction might be a subtle one, so let me illuminate by way of an example. In the debate over Jefferson’s bill to disestablish religion in Virginia (i.e., to end tax support for state-supported churches in Virginia), Patrick Henry was the bill’s most notable opponent. Henry did not, however, argue that churches should receive tax support in order to promote the salvation of souls. Rather, he basically argued that churches promoted behavior that lead to the better functioning of society, and therefore left everyone better off. For example, higher church attendance is associated with lower crime rates, more stable families, higher levels of trust, etc.
All of these things are good things, but they all concern temporal matters and, hence, are within the proper domain of the civil government -- Henry argued for religious establishment on purely civil grounds, and not on spiritual grounds. (Indeed, Henry implicitly invoked the modern economic notion of “public goods” – goods that generate non-excludable benefits that, consequently, and underprovided when up to voluntary provision. This is a classic justification for government intervention.)
This type of involvement with religion seems to me consistent with what the Augsburg says in article xxviii. Spiritual welfare is left to the church; temporal welfare is left to the state. But the state can involve itself in ecclesiastical matters to the extent that it does so to advance civil interests. Thus, for example, a civil ruler could involve himself in a doctrinal dispute, not for the purpose of promoting true doctrine, but to maintain the peace of civil society in the event of doctrinal disputes.
Problem with Suggestion #3. It seems dangerous to invite the civil government to use the church for its own purposes. It seems easily to glide into cynical manipulation of religion for its own purposes, even when those purposes might be ungodly. Nonetheless, we do see this today in different contexts. Governments allow prison ministries into prison not because they are concerned about the eternal welfare of the imprisoned, but because allowing these ministries into the prison assists them to keep the peace in prison, and potentially to assist them in lowering rates of recidivism. (I don’t know that there are good data on the latter point. I’d be interested in seeing any.)
Those are the more obvious alternatives that I’ve thought of. Additional thoughts are welcomed. I’ll probably have an additional post on some things that Melanchthon and Chemnitz wrote related to this topic.